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Abstract
Fishburn (1970) showed that in an inﬁnite society Arrow’s axioms for a pref-
erence aggregation rule do not necessarily imply the existence of a dictator.
In those cases in which there is no dictator, Kirman and Sondermann (1972)
suggested two different approaches to justify that something similar to dic-
tatorship occurs: one measure–theoretic, the other topological. Both ap-
proaches have their shortcomings. We develop here a third, set–theoretic,
approach, and show its domain of applicability. We consider a model in
which there are arbitrarily many agents and alternatives, and admissible
coalitions may be restricted to lie in an algebra. In this framework (which
includes the standard one), we characterize, in terms of Strict Neutrality, the
Ultraﬁlter Property of preference aggregation rules. Based on this property,
we deﬁne and characterize the different classes of dictatorial–like rules.
JEL: D71, C69.
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In many models of social choice, it is convenient to model the society as com-
posed by an inﬁnite set of individuals (see, e.g., Armstrong [2], Banks, Duggan
and Le Breton [5], Gomberg, Martinelli and Torres [9], and Mihara [13], [14]).
However, Fishburn [7] showed1 that in this case there may exist Arrovian prefer-
ence aggregation rules that are not dictatorial. From then on, several authors have
attempted to show that nondictatorial Arrovian rules are in some sense close to
a dictatorship. This work was ﬁrst undertaken by Kirman and Sondermann [12],
who suggested two different lines to approach the problem. The ﬁrst line was
measure-theoretic: the authors showed that if the agent set is an atomless proba-
bility measure space, then any nondictatorial Arrovian rule has decisive sets (that
is, coalitionsthatcanimposetheirstrictpreferencesonsociety)ofarbitrarilysmall
measure. This approach was contested by Schmitz [15], who showed that, if the
agent set has a σ-ﬁnite but inﬁnite measure, then one can always construct non-
dictatorial Arrovian rules for which all decisive sets have inﬁnite measure. A
second line suggested by Kirman and Sondermann was topological: restricting
themselves to the case in which there are ﬁnitely many alternatives, they showed
that the agent set can be enlarged in such a way (the Stone-ˇ Cech compactiﬁcation)
that the original proﬁle of preferences determines the preferences of all agents in
the larger set, and each Arrovian rule has a dictator in the enlarged space. They
referred to dictators in the larger space that do not belong to the original one as in-
visible dictators. The topological approach initiated by Kirman and Sondermann
was extended by Armstrong [2] to measurable structures and arbitrary sets of al-
ternatives. In the topological approach followed by Armstrong, one constructs a
(discrete–like) topology2 on the agent space and shows that the invisible dictators
lie in its Stone-ˇ Cech compactiﬁcation. The problem with this approach is that, if
the original agent space is endowed with a topology that for some reason is rele-
vant, this topology is essentially ignored in the construction of the enlarged agent
space. Thus, one can always associate “invisible dictators” with nondictatorial
Arrovian rules, but in a manner that in some cases may seem somewhat arbitrary.
In this paper, we pursue a third, set-theoretic, approach to show that to nondic-
tatorial Arrovian rules there correspond arbitrarily small decisive coalitions. Our
approach works also in the case of agent spaces where coalitons are restricted to
1Fishburn attributes prior knowledge of this result to Julian Blau. See Hansson [11].
2In this topology, the original agent set (after identifying points that are not separated by the
algebra) is viewed as a subspace of the Stone space that corresponds to the algebra of coalitions.
The Stone space is a totally disconnected compact topological space. See Sikorski [16].
1lie in a measurable structure (an algebra or σ-algebra). In the latter case we can-
not always apply this approach (as a matter of fact we construct counterexamples
where it does not work), but we show that it is applicable in practically all the
cases that have been considered in the literature.
We ﬁrst consider the (Fishburn’s, Kirman and Sondermann’s) case in which
all coalitions are admissible. These authors were the ﬁrst3 to show the Ultraﬁlter
Property of Arrovian rules: the collection of all decisive coalitions that correspond
to any Arrovian rule is an ultraﬁlter. With inﬁnitely many agents, there are non-
dictatorial Arrovian rules if the corresponding ultraﬁlter has an empty intersection
(it is a free ultraﬁlter). In the latter case, we show that, out of any free ultraﬁlter,
one can select a collection of nested decisive coalitions that shrink to the empty
set. This is our set-theoretic concept of smallness.
Whenever the sets of alternatives and/or individuals are inﬁnite, to develop
a theory of social choice one eventually needs to resort to measurable structures
(see, e.g., Armstrong [2], Banks, Duggan and Le Breton [5], Gomberg, Martinelli
and Torres [9]). We consider next Arrovian rules in inﬁnite societies with a mea-
surable structure, i.e. an algebra or σ-algebra of admissible coalitions. We begin
by showing that in this case there may be two different kinds of “invisible dic-
tators”: non-measurable invisible dictators (when the intersection of all decisive
coalitions is a non-measurable set) and empty invisible dictators (when the inter-
section of all decisive coalitions is empty). We provide a necessary and sufﬁcient
condition for non-measurable invisible dictators to exist, and precisely character-
ize the decisive coalitions, as well as the preference aggregation rules, in this case.
It turns out that, though essentially quite different, non-measurable invisible dicta-
tors are closest in spirit to the invisible dictators one obtains under the topological
approach. Next, we focus on the study of empty invisible dictators, in which
we try to investigate under what conditions our “selection problem” (selecting a
nested subcollection that has an empty intersection out of the free ultraﬁlter of all
decisive coalitions) has a solution. We show that, for any algebra of admissible
coalitions, the selection problem has always a solution when the set of agents is
countable4. Actually, we show that this result is true for arbitrary agent spaces,
3See below for a formal deﬁnition of ultraﬁlters. This result was ﬁrst shown by Kirman and
Sondermann [12], and was implicit in the proof given by Fishburn [7]. Essentially, it was earlier
discovered by Guilbaud [10] as a consistency condition for the aggregation of preferences. (I
thank Alan Kirman for pointing me in the direction that allowed me to ﬁnd this earlier reference.)
Hansson [11] also found it independently in a working paper circulated before the appearance of
Kirman and Sondermann’s article.
4When the set of agents is countable, Mihara [14] provides a constructive procedure to charac-
2provided there is a countable decisive coalition. We display a counterexample to
show that, when the admissible coalitions form an algebra and the set of agents
is uncountable, the selection may not be possible if no decisive set is countable.
For an arbitrary agent set, we show that the selection is always possible whenever
the admissible coalitions are restricted to a σ-algebra, provided this σ-algebra is
countably generated. This covers the usual set-up considered in probability the-
ory: the agent set is a Borel space with its corresponding induced σ–algebra.
Summing up, when there are no measurability constraints on coalitions, one
can always select a decreasing collection with an empty intersection out of any
free ultraﬁlter. When one restricts admissible coalitions to lie in an algebra or a
σ-algebra, then this selection may not be possible if the collection of admissible
coalitions is too narrow with respect to the cardinality of the agent space. We
describe broad classes of cases in which this does not happen, but we also give
examples when it does happen. Note that the latter case can be attributed to the
lack of adequacy of the collection of admissible coalitions, rather than to a fault
in the selection as a solution concept.
As we mentioned before, Schmitz [15] showed that, if the agent space has
an inﬁnite σ-ﬁnite measure, then, given a free ultraﬁlter of decisive coalitions,
there do not necessarily exist decisive coalitions of arbitrarily small measure. As
examples of spaces satisfying his requirements, Schmitz cites the naturals with a
counting measure, and Rn with its Borel subsets and Lebesgue measure. In both
cases our selection result applies, and it implies that it is still possible to refer to
“arbitrarily small” decisive coalitions, though in set-theoretic terms rather than in
terms of measures.
The model we use is presented in section 2. In section 3, we characterize the
Ultraﬁlter Property in the general framework (arbitrary sets of individuals and al-
ternatives, measurable structures) we are considering. We resort to the Strict Neu-
trality property which has been recently used by Geanakoplos [8] and ´ Ubeda [17]
to provide very efﬁcient proofs of Arrow’s theorem in the ﬁnite case. We show
that, in general, the Ultraﬁlter Property holds if, and only if, the preference aggre-
gation rule satisﬁes Unanimity and Strict Neutrality. In particular, this implies the
known fact that dictatorial rules are not necessarily Arrovian when one moves out
of the domain of linear orders.
Our main contributions about invisible dictators and the selection problem are
presented in section 4. In section 5 we conclude. We relegate technical results to
an appendix.
terize the invisible dictators. His focus, though, is quite different from ours.
32 The model
The (non-empty) set of individuals is denoted by N, which can be either ﬁnite
or inﬁnite. Admissible coalitions of individuals are members of an algebra L of
subsets of N.
The (non-empty) set of alternatives is denoted by X. This set can be either
ﬁnite or inﬁnite, but it must have at least three different elements. Each individ-
ual has a (weak) preference relation on X, i.e. a reﬂexive, transitive and complete
binary relation (a complete preorder). Let R denote the set of all preference rela-
tions on X. Given a preference relation R on X, we deﬁne its indicator function,
I(R) : X ×X → {−1,0,1}, by
I(R)(x,y) =

 
 
−1 if yRx and not xRy;
0 if xRy and yRx;
1 if xRy and not yRx.
A preference proﬁle is a mapping ρ : N → R. Given a proﬁle of preferences
ρ, we deﬁne its indicator function, I(ρ) : X ×X → {−1,0,1}N, by
I(ρ)(x,y) =

I[ρ(i)](x,y)

i∈N
We consider the following assumptions:
(FC) For any i ∈ N, the singleton {i} belongs to L.
(UD) For any x,y ∈ X, the mapping i 7→ I[ρ(i)](x,y), from N to {−1,0,1}, is
L–measurable.
Assumption (FC) means that all ﬁnite sets, and hence their complements, the
coﬁnite sets, belong to L (the letters FC stand for “ﬁnite and coﬁnite”). Assump-
tion (UD) means that all rankings among any given ﬁnite subset of alternatives are
admissible (the letters UD stand for “universal domain”). Technically, assumption
(UD) imposes a measurability requirement on the proﬁles of preferences that are
allowed.
3 The Ultraﬁlter Property
Denote by RN
L the set of all preference proﬁles that satisfy assumption (UD). A
preference aggregation rule is a map
f : RN
L → R
4That is, with each preference proﬁle ρ the rule f associates a social preference
relation on X.
Deﬁnition 1 Given a preference aggregation rule f, we say that a coalition A ∈
L is f–decisive (for short, decisive) if
∀i ∈ A, I[ρ(i)](x,y) = 1 =⇒ I[f(ρ)](x,y) = 1.
Deﬁnition 2 Given a preference aggregation rule f, we say that an individual
i ∈ N is a dictator if the coalition {i} is f–decisive.
We consider the following properties a preference aggregation rule f may sat-
isfy. We deﬁne later the concept of an ultraﬁlter.
• Unanimity or weak Pareto: The coalition N of all individuals is f–decisive.
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives or Pairwise Independence (PI):
I(ρ)(x,y) = I(ρ0)(x,y) =⇒ I[f(ρ)](x,y) = I[f(ρ0)](x,y).
• Strict Neutrality (SN):
I(ρ)(x,y) = I(ρ0)(x0,y0) ∈ {−1,1}N
=⇒ I[f(ρ)](x,y) = I[f(ρ0)](x0,y0) ∈ {−1,1}.
• Ultraﬁlter Property (UP): The set of all f–decisive coalitions is an ultraﬁl-
ter.
Geanakoplos [8] and ´ Ubeda [17] have recently developed very efﬁcient proofs
of Arrow’s theorem in the ﬁnite case, by showing ﬁrst that Arrovian rules satisfy
Strict Neutrality. We actually show something stronger: Strict Neutrality together
with Unanimity is equivalent to the Ultraﬁlter Property. The fact that Arrovian
rules satisfy the Ultraﬁlter Property was proved for the inﬁnite, but not measur-
able, case by Kirman and Sondermann [12]. Armstrong [2] was the ﬁrst to show
that the same result is valid when admissible coalitons are restricted to an algebra.
See also Austen-Smith and Banks [4], section 2.4, for generalizations in the ﬁnite
case.
Lemma 1 (Geanakoplos, ´ Ubeda) Let (UD) hold, and assume the preference ag-
gregation rule f satisﬁes Unanimity and Pairwise Independence (PI). Then:
5(i) Strict individual preferences result in a strict social preference:
I(ρ)(x,y) ∈ {−1,1}N =⇒ I[f(ρ)](x,y) ∈ {−1,1}.
(ii) f satisﬁes Strict Neutrality (SN).
PROOF: Suppose that
I(ρ)(x,y) ∈ {−1,1}N.
Since X has at least 3 different elements, there is z ∈ X such that z / ∈ {x,y}. As-
sume, without loss of generality, that I[f(ρ)](x,y)∈{0,1} (otherwise, reverse the
roles of x and y).
Let ρ0 be a proﬁle that satisﬁes I(ρ0)(x,y) = I(ρ0)(z,y) = I(ρ)(x,y).
Letρ00 beaproﬁlethatsatisﬁesI(ρ00)(x,y)=I(ρ)(x,y), I(ρ00)(z,y)=I(ρ0)(z,y),
and I(ρ00)(z,x) ∈ {1}N.
By unanimity, I[f(ρ00)](z,x)=1. By (PI), I[f(ρ00)](x,y)∈{0,1}, so by transi-
tivityof f(ρ00), wemusthaveI[f(ρ00)](z,y)=1. Applyagain(PI)togetI[f(ρ0)](z,y)=
1.
Let now ρ000 be a proﬁle that satisﬁes I(ρ000)(x,y) = I(ρ)(x,y), I(ρ000)(z,y) =
I(ρ0)(z,y), and I(ρ000)(z,x) ∈ {−1}N.
By unanimity, I[f(ρ000)](z,x) = −1. By (PI), I[f(ρ000)](z,y) = 1, so by transi-
tivity of f(ρ000), we must have I[f(ρ000)](x,y) = 1.
(PI) then implies that I[f(ρ)](x,y) = 1. This concludes the proof of the ﬁrst
statement.
Let us now consider Strict Neutrality. Assume
I(ρ)(x,y) = I(ρ0)(x0,y0) ∈ {−1,1}N.
We have just shown that I[f(ρ)](x,y) ∈ {−1,1}. Assume, without loss of gen-
erality, that I[f(ρ)](x,y) = 1 (otherwise, reverse the roles of x and y, and x0 and
y0).
If (x,y) = (x0,y0), apply (PI) to obtain I[f(ρ0)](x0,y0) = I[f(ρ)](x,y). There-
fore, suppose in what follows that (x,y) 6= (x0,y0).
Letρ00 beaproﬁlethatsatisﬁesI(ρ00)(x,y)=I(ρ)(x,y), I(ρ00)(x0,y0)=I(ρ0)(x0,y0),
and, additionally,

x 6= x0 ⇒ I(ρ00)(x,x0) ∈ {−1}N ⇒ I[f(ρ00)](x,x0) = −1;
y 6= y0 ⇒ I(ρ00)(y,y0) ∈ {1}N ⇒ I[f(ρ00)](y,y0) = 1.
Where the second implications follow because of unanimity. Also, (PI) implies
I[f(ρ00)](x,y) = I[f(ρ)](x,y) = 1.
6Now (x,y) 6= (x0,y0) means that either x 6= x0 or y 6= y0, and in either case
transitivity of f(ρ00) implies I[f(ρ00)](x0,y0)=1. A ﬁnal application of (PI) results
in I[f(ρ0)](x0,y0) = 1. 2
The next lemma is similar in spirit to the pivotal argument used by Geanako-
plos [8] and ´ Ubeda [17].
Lemma 2 Let (UD) hold, and assume the preference aggregation rule f satisﬁes
Unanimity and Strict Neutrality (SN). Let x,y ∈ X, x 6= y, and let S,T ∈ L satisfy
S ⊂ T ⊂ N. Let ρ0 and ρ1 be proﬁles in which:
∀i ∈ S, I[ρ0(i)](x,y) = 1, I[ρ1(i)](x,y) = 1;
∀i ∈ T \S, I[ρ0(i)](x,y) = −1, I[ρ1(i)](x,y) = 1;
∀i ∈ N\T, I[ρ0(i)](x,y) = −1, I[ρ1(i)](x,y) = −1.
Then I[f(ρ0)](x,y) = −1 and I[f(ρ1)](x,y) = 1 imply that T \S is a decisive
coalition.
PROOF: Let a,b ∈ X, with a 6= b, and assume that ρ is an arbitrary proﬁle in
which, for all i ∈ T \S, I[ρ(i)](a,b) = 1.
Let c ∈ X be such that c / ∈ {a,b} (this is possible because X has at least three
different elements). Let ρ0 be a proﬁle in which
I(ρ0)(a,b) = I(ρ)(a,b),
and, additionally,
∀i ∈ S, I[ρ(i)](a,c) = 1, and I[ρ(i)](b,c) = 1;
∀i ∈ T \S, I[ρ(i)](a,c) = 1, and I[ρ(i)](b,c) = −1;
∀i ∈ N\T, I[ρ(i)](a,c) = −1, and I[ρ(i)](b,c) = −1.
NowI(ρ0)(b,c)=I(ρ0)(x,y)andI[f(ρ0)](x,y)=−1imply, by(SN),thatI[f(ρ0)](b,c)=
−1.
Analogously, I(ρ0)(a,c) = I(ρ1)(x,y) and I[f(ρ1)](x,y) = 1 imply, by (SN),
that I[f(ρ0)](a,c) = 1.
By transitivity, I[f(ρ0)](a,b) = 1, and by (SN), I[f(ρ)](a,b) = 1. 2
7Lemma 3 Let (UD) hold, and assume the preference aggregation rule f satisﬁes
Unanimity and Strict Neutrality (SN). Let x,y ∈ X, x 6= y, let T ∈ L, and let ρ be
a proﬁle in which:
∀i ∈ T, I[ρ(i)](x,y) = 1;
∀i ∈ N\T, I[ρ(i)](x,y) = −1.
Then I[f(ρ)](x,y) = 1 implies that T is a decisive coalition.
PROOF: Let S = / 0, let ρ0 be the proﬁle in which all individuals strictly prefer y
to x, and let ρ1 = ρ. Then use Unanimity and apply lemma 2. 2
Lemma 4 Let (UD) hold, and assume the preference aggregation rule satisﬁes
Unanimity and Strict Neutrality (SN). Suppose T ∈ L is decisive, and S ⊂ T,
S ∈ L. Then either S or T \S (but not both) is decisive.
PROOF: Let ρ0 and ρ1 be as in the statement of lemma 2.
By (SN), we must have I[f(ρ0)](x,y) ∈ {−1,1}.
If I[f(ρ0)](x,y) = 1, lemma 3 implies that S is decisive.
Since by assumption T is decisive, we know that I[f(ρ1)](x,y) = 1, so if
I[f(ρ0)](x,y) = −1, lemma 2 implies that T \S is decisive. 2
Lemma 5 Let (UD) hold, and assume the preference aggregation rule satisﬁes
Unanimity and Strict Neutrality (SN). Then the intersection of any two decisive
coalitions is a decisive coalition.
PROOF: Let S and T be decisive coalitions in L. Then T is the union of the
disjoint sets S∩T and T \S. Now T \S is disjoint from the decisive coalition S,
so by deﬁnition it cannot be decisive. Therefore, lemma 4 implies that S∩T is
decisive. 2
A (non-empty) collection C of non-empty subsets of N is (downward) ﬁltering
if for each A,B ∈C there existsC ∈C such that A ⊃C and B ⊃C, that is, A∩B ⊃
C. A ﬁlter is the collection of all supersets of a ﬁltering collection. In other
words, a collection D of subsets of N is a ﬁlter (Bourbaki [6], I.6.1) if: (i) / 0 / ∈ D;
(ii) A,B ∈ D implies A∩B ∈ D; and (iii) A ∈ D and A ⊂ B implies B ∈ D. A
ﬁlter is an ultraﬁlter if there is no other ﬁlter that strictly contains it. Using this
maximality property, it can be shown (Bourbaki [6], I.6.4), that a ﬁlter D is an
8ultraﬁlter iff ∀A, precisely one of A and N \A is in D. An ultraﬁlter D is called
free if ∩{D : D ∈ D} = / 0.
Given an algebra L, a collection D of sets of L is an L-ﬁlter if: (i) / 0 / ∈ D;
(ii) A,B ∈ D implies A∩B ∈ D; and (iii) A ∈ D, B ∈ L, and A ⊂ B implies
B ∈ D. An L-ﬁlter is an L-ultraﬁlter if there is no other L-ﬁlter that strictly
contains it. The (ultra)ﬁlters not restricted to lie in an algebra can be identiﬁed
with 2N-(ultra)ﬁlters. Given any 2N-(ultra)ﬁlter F, the intersection F ∩L is an
L-(ultra)ﬁlter. Any collection of nonempty sets closed under ﬁnite intersections
is always contained in a 2N-ﬁlter; hence, given an L-ﬁlter D there is a 2N-ﬁlter
F that contains it, and we have that F ∩L ⊃ D. In particular, if D is an L-
ultraﬁlter and F is any 2N-ﬁlter that contains it, we must have F ∩L =D. Con-
cluding, D is an L-ultraﬁlter if, and only if, there is a 2N-ultraﬁlter U such that
D = U ∩L. That is, an L-ﬁlter D is an L-ultraﬁlter iff ∀A ∈ L, precisely one
of A and N \A is in D. The theory of measurable ﬁlters and ultraﬁlters has been
developed in the context of the study of Boolean Algebras (see Sikorski [16]).
Theorem 1 (Ultraﬁlter Property) Let (UD) hold. Then a preference aggrega-
tion rule f satisﬁes Unanimity and Strict Neutrality (SN) if, and only if, the col-
lection of all f–decisive sets forms an L–ultraﬁlter.
PROOF: Assume f satisﬁes Unanimity and (SN). Let D be the collection of all
f–decisive coalitions. Unanimity implies that N ∈ D and / 0 / ∈ D. We have seen
(lemma 5) that D is closed under (ﬁnite) intersections, and by deﬁnition supersets
of elements of D are in D. This implies that D is a ﬁlter. Now, taking T = N in
lemma 4, we obtain that D is an ultraﬁlter.
Assume now that f satisﬁes the Ultraﬁlter Property, that is, the collection D
of all f–decisive sets forms an L–ultraﬁlter. Since N ∈D, Unanimity is satisﬁed.
Let us show that (SN) holds as well. Assume that
I(ρ)(x,y) = I(ρ0)(x0,y0) ∈ {−1,1}N.
Let S ={i∈N :I[ρ(i)](x,y)=1}. If S ∈D, then I[f(ρ)](x,y)=I[f(ρ0)](x0,y0)=
1. Otherwise, N\S ∈ D, which implies I[f(ρ)](x,y) = I[f(ρ0)](x0,y0) = −1. 2
Theorem 1 gives a complete characterization of the Ultraﬁlter Property. It is
important to notice that, in our domain of preferences, if f satisﬁes the Ultraﬁlter
Property, then f is not necessarily an Arrovian rule. This is only true over the
domain of linear orders, where indifference between distinct alternatives is not
9allowed. Actually, it is easy to construct simple (ﬁnite) examples in which a dic-
tatorial rule does not satisfy Pairwise Independence. For example, it is possible
for a dictatorial rule to have x strictly preferred to y and the opposite preference,
for two different proﬁles in which individual preferences between x and y do not
change, as long as the dictator is indifferent between both alternatives. What is
true, however, is that, corresponding to any such f, there exists an Arrovian pref-
erence aggregation rule that has exactly the same decisive sets: the simple rule
generated by those decisive sets (see section 6.1 in the appendix).
Theorem 1 together with lemma 1 imply:
Corollary 1 (Arrovian Rules and Ultraﬁlters) Let (UD) hold, and assume the
preference aggregation rule f satisﬁes Unanimity and Pairwise Independence.
Then f satisﬁes the Ultraﬁlter Property.
When the set of individuals N is ﬁnite, and assumption (FC) holds, then all
singletons are admissible coalitions, and any ultraﬁlter D is of the form: D =
{S ⊂ N : S 3 i}, for some i ∈ N. In particular, {i} is a decisive coalition—that is,
a dictator.
Corollary 2 (Arrow’s Theorem) Let (UD) and (FC) hold. Assume the prefer-
ence aggregation rule f satisﬁes Unanimity and Pairwise Independence. Assume
additionally that N is a ﬁnite set. Then f is dictatorial.
4 Invisible Dictators
Whenever there are no measurability constraints on the admissible coalitions, an
ultraﬁlter of decisive coalitions is either free (it has an empty intersection) or ﬁxed
(its intersection is a single point). Let us consider the non measurable case; that
is, assume for the moment that L =2N. We have seen that an Arrovian rule f has
associated a collection of decisive sets D that is an ultraﬁlter. Deﬁne N =

A ⊂
N : N \A ∈ D
	
; we say that the coalitions in N are negligible: the preference
aggregation rule f acts independently5 of the preferences of the members of any
such coalition. If D is a free ultraﬁlter, one can say that the rule f is invisibly
5Almost independently, to be precise. Consider a lexicographic chain of dictators: the ﬁrst
dictator’s strict preferences decide; when the ﬁrst dictator is indiferent, the second dictator’s strict
preferences decide; and so on. In this case, a set is decisive if, and only if, it contains the ﬁrst
dictator. Overlooking this possibility led to a mistake in Armstrong’s [2] initial paper, which was
corrected in [3].
10dictatorial, because then the union of all negligible coalitions is the entire agent
set N.6 Therefore, when L = 2N Arrovian rules are either dictatorial or invisibly
dictatorial.
Unfortunately, this characterization is not necessarily valid when L is differ-
ent from 2N. In the measurable case there is a third possibility. We need to deﬁne
some concepts to illustrate it.
We say that a nonempty set A ∈ L is an atom of L if, for any B ∈ L, B ⊂ A
implies that B ∈ {A, / 0}. Whenever assumption (FC) holds, the atoms of L are
precisely the singletons, but in general this need not be the case. An algebra need
not have any atoms, as example 1 below shows.
Let i, j ∈ N, i 6= j; we say that an algebra L separates i and j if there exists
A ∈ L such that i ∈ A and j ∈ N \A. We say that L separates the points of N
if it separates any two distinct points. Given an algebra L, any two points that
are not separated by it are in a sense indistinguishable; this is formalized by the
following deﬁnition. We say that i ∼ j if L does not separate i and j, i.e. if
[∀A ∈ L, i ∈ A ⇔ j ∈ A]. It is immediate to see that ∼ is an equivalence relation
(a reﬂexive, symmetric and transitive binary relation). Given i∈N, let a(i) denote
the equivalence class of i. It follows from the deﬁnition of the equivalence relation
that, for any i ∈ N and A ∈ L, either a(i) ⊂ A or a(i)∩A = / 0. We denote by N/∼
the quotient space, the set of all equivalence classes.
In general, an equivalence class need not be measurable, as example 1 below
shows. If all the equivalence classes are measurable, we say that the algebra L
is fully atomic. In subsection 6.2 in the appendix we show that an atom is always
an equivalence class, and that equivalence classes are atoms whenever they are
measurable. In the following example the algebra separates the points, so that the
equivalence classes are the singletons, but they are not measurable, and therefore
there are not any atoms.
Example 1. Let N = [0,1), and let L be the algebra generated by the intervals
of the form [a,b), with a < b (this algebra is formed by ﬁnite unions of such
intervals, and all intervals that are in sets belonging to the algebra have positive
length). Note that: (1) the algebra separates the points of [0,1); (2) there are no
atoms, since singletons are not measurable. Given any i ∈ [0,1), let D consist
of all the elements of L that contain i. Then the ultraﬁlter is not free, since its
intersection is {i}, but {i} itself is not an admissible coalition. 2
Since Kirman and Sondermann [12] considered the case in which all coali-
6I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this argument.
11tions are admissible7, nondictatorial Arrovian rules (invisible dictators) always
correspond in their case to free ultraﬁlters. When there is an algebra of admissible
coalitions, the above example shows that we have another kind of “invisible dic-
tator,” for which actually the terminology is even more appropriate. We therefore
reﬁne that terminology to include the new case.
Deﬁnition 3 Given a preference aggregation rule, let D be the collection of ad-
missible (belonging to L) decisive coalitions. Assume D 6= / 0, and let M = ∩{D :
D ∈ D}. We say that a preference aggregation rule has:
(i) A measurable dictator if M is an atom of the algebra L of admissible
coalitions.
(ii) An empty invisible dictator if M = / 0.
(iii) A non-measurable invisible dictator if M 6= / 0 and M / ∈ L.
If the agent set N is ﬁnite, then a trivial extension of Arrow’s theorem implies
that, whenever the preference aggregation rule satisﬁes unanimity and (PI), there
is always a measurable dictator. Note that a measurable dictator need not be a
single individual unless assumption (FC) is satisﬁed. In the general case, we have
the following result.
Proposition 1 (Visible or Invisible Dictators) Let (UD) hold. Assume the pref-
erenceaggregationrulesatisﬁesUnanimityandPairwiseIndependence(PI).Then
thereiseitherameasurabledictator, anemptyinvisibledictator, oranon-measurable
invisible dictator.
PROOF: By corollary 1, we know that the collection D of all decisive coalitions
forms an ultraﬁlter.
Consider the intersection M = ∩{D : D ∈ D}. If M = / 0, then it is an empty
invisible dictator by deﬁnition. Assume now that M 6= / 0. In the appendix (propo-
sition 3) we show that in this case M is an equivalence class of the equivalence
relation that identiﬁes points that are not separated by L. If M ∈ L, then it is
an atom of L (see lemma 8 in the appendix): in this case we have a measurable
dictator. Otherwise, if M / ∈ L we have a non-measurable invisible dictator. 2
7Except in the case in which they assumed the agent space is an atomless probability space,
in which they implicitly assume that only coalitions belonging to the underlying σ-algebra are
admissible.
124.1 Non-measurable invisible dictators
Example 1 above suggests that the existence of non-measurable dictators is related
to the measurability of the equivalence classes (equivalently, to the existence of
atoms in L). The next proposition formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 2 (Existence of non-measurable dictators) Let (UD) hold. There
exists a preference aggregation rule that satisﬁes Unanimity and Pairwise Inde-
pendence (PI) and has a non-measurable dictator if, and only if, there exists a
non-measurable equivalence class of the relation that identiﬁes points that are
not separated by L. In particular, if assumption (FC) is satisﬁed there do not
exist any non-measurable invisible dictators.
PROOF: Assume ﬁrst there exists i ∈ N such that the equivalence class of i is not
a member of L. Let D be the ultraﬁlter of all sets in L that contain i. Consider
the simple rule deﬁned by D (see subsection 6.1 in the appendix). In lemma 6
in the appendix we show that this preference aggregation rule satisﬁes unanimity
and (PI), and the collection of its decisive sets is D. By construction, this rule has
as a non-measurable dictator the equivalence class of i (see proposition 3 in the
appendix).
On the other hand, if a preference aggregation rule satisﬁes unanimity and
(PI), we know from corollary 1 that the collection of decisive coalitions forms an
ultraﬁlter, and we know from proposition 3 in the appendix that the intersection
of all decisive coalitions is an equivalence class. 2
Corollary 3 Let (UD) hold. If there exists a set A ∈ L that does not contain any
atoms, then there is a preference aggregation rule that satisﬁes Unanimity and
Pairwise Independence (PI) and has a non-measurable dictator which is a subset
of A.
PROOF: Given any i ∈ A, the equivalence class of i is entirely contained in A and
is not measurable because then it would be an atom (see lemma 8 in the appendix),
so we can construct an Arrovian rule as in the proof of the previous result. 2
The proof of proposition 2 actually shows us that non-measurable dictators
corresponding to Arrovian rules are “small” in a precise sense.
13Theorem 2 (Smallness of non-measurable dictators) Let (UD) hold. Assume
that a preference aggregation rule satisﬁes Unanimity and Pairwise Independence
(PI) and has a non-measurable dictator. Then the dictator is an equivalence class
oftherelationthatidentiﬁespointsthatarenotseparatedbyL, andthecollection
of decisive sets consists precisely of all admissible coalitions that contain this
equivalence class.
PROOF: We know from corollary 1 that, given an Arrovian rule, the collection
of all decisive coalitions forms an ultraﬁlter. Proposition 3 in the appendix im-
plies therefore that if an Arrovian rule has a non-measurable dictator, this latter
is necessarily an equivalence class. By deﬁnition, all decisive sets contain this
equivalence class. Since all admissible coalitions that contain the equivalence
class form an ultraﬁlter, both ultraﬁlters must necessarily be the same. 2
Example 2. In the space N of the natural numbers, consider the algebra gener-
ated by the collection of sets Ek = {2kn : n ∈ N}, for k ∈ N. Note ﬁrst of all that
this algebra contains no ﬁnite sets. The odd numbers are an atom of the algebra,
therefore all of them belong to the same equivalence class. On the other hand, the
algebra separates any two even numbers, so that the equivalence class of any even
number is a singleton. Since the algebra does not contain any ﬁnite set, the equiv-
alence class of any even number is not measurable. For any k ∈ N, theorem 2
shows how we can construct an Arrovian rule that has 2k as a non-measurable
invisible dictator. 2
4.2 Empty invisible dictators
From now on we will concentrate on empty invisible dictators. We formulate the
smallness of empty invisible dictators as a selection problem: out of any ultra-
ﬁlter of decisive coalitions that has a empty intersection, one can select a nested
collection that shrinks to the empty set. If there are no measurability constraints,
this selection is always valid. In what follows, by an Arrovian (preference aggre-
gation) rule we mean a preference aggregation rule that satisﬁes Unanimity and
Pairwise Independence.
Theorem 3 (Smallness of Empty Invisible Dictators) Assumethatallcoalitions
are admissible: L = 2N. Then for any Arrovian rule that has an empty invisible
dictator there exists a nested collection of decisive coalitions that has an empty
intersection.
14PROOF: Let D be the ultraﬁlter of all decisive coalitions, which by hypothesis
has an empty intersection.
If we partially order D by (reverse) inclusion there can be no maximal el-
ement, since if one existed it would coincide with the intersection. (If ˆ D ∈ D
is maximal, then given any D ∈ D, we must have ˆ D ⊂ D, since the facts that
ˆ D∩D ∈ D and ˆ D is maximal imply that ˆ D∩D = ˆ D, i.e. ˆ D ⊂ D.)
By (the contrapositive of) Zorn’s lemma, there must exist a chain C in D
that has no upper bound. Let B = ∩{C : C ∈ C}. Note ﬁrst that B / ∈ D, since
if B were a member of D then it would be an upper bound of the chain. Since
D is an ultraﬁlter, we have that N \B ∈ D. Therefore, for each C ∈ C, the set
C\B =C∩(N\B) belongs to D. But then the chain C 0 = {C\B : C ∈ C} has an
empty intersection. 2
Kirman and Sondermann [12] showed that, whenever the space of agents is
an atomless ﬁnite measure space, then an empty invisible dictator is characterized
by the fact that there are coalitions of arbitrarily small measure that are decisive.
Whenever there are no measurability requirements on coalitions, the previous the-
orem shows that one does not need to deﬁne a measure to see that, in a precise
sense, invisible dictators correspond to arbitrarily small decisive coalitions. We
next show that, even if admissible coalitions are restricted to an algebra, the result
is still true whenever N is a countable set. A constructive proof works in this case.
Theorem 4 (The countable case) Assume that N is a countable set, and L any
algebra of its subsets. Then for any Arrovian rule that has an empty invisible
dictator there exists a nested collection of decisive coalitions that has an empty
intersection.
PROOF: LetD1 ∈D beanydecisivecoalition. Let{ik : k∈N}beanenumeration
of the elements of D1. Since the intersection of all decisive coalitons is empty,
given i1 there exists D0
2 ∈ D that does not contain i1. Let now D2 = D1 ∩D0
2.
Next, if i2 / ∈ D2 then let D3 = D2, and otherwise proceed as above to construct a
set D3 ⊂ D2 that does not contain i2. In this manner, we construct inductively a
nested collection of decisive sets Dk, for k ∈ N, with an empty intersection. 2
The steps followed in the proof of the previous theorem can be used to prove
a much more general result.
Corollary 4 (Countable decisive sets) Let N be an arbitrary agent set, and L
any algebra of its subsets. Suppose that an Arrovian rule has among its decisive
15sets one that is countable. Then, if the rule has an empty invisible dictator there
exists a nested collection of decisive coalitions that has an empty intersection.
PROOF: Let D1 be the countable decisive set which exists by hypothesis. Enu-
merate its elements: D1 = {ik : k ∈ N}. By proceeding as in the proof of theo-
rem 4, we can construct a sequence of nested decisive coalitions (Dk)k∈N that has
an empty intersection. 2
However, when the condition of the previous corollary is not met, then the
selection problem need not have a solution, as the following example shows.
Example 3. Let N be an uncountable agent space, and let L be the algebra of
ﬁnite and coﬁnite (complements of ﬁnite) sets. Then the only free ultraﬁlter on
L consists of the collection of all coﬁnite sets. Notice that no countable coalition
is admissible. By taking complements, our problem can be stated in terms of
looking for an increasing collection of ﬁnite sets whose union is N. Assume such
acollectionexists, anddeﬁneamappingfromittothenaturalnumbersassociating
with each set its cardinality. The mapping must be injective because the collection
is increasing (two different sets have different cardinality), and this then implies
that the collection can be at most countable8, and hence its union must be at most
countable, and therefore cannot coincide with N. 2
Assume from now on that L is a σ-algebra, that is, an algebra closed under
countable unions and intersections. We will show next that, for practically all un-
countable cases that have been considered in the literature, the selection problem
has a solution.
We say that a σ-algebra L is countably generated if there is a countable
collection S of subsets of N, for which L is the smallest σ-algebra containing
S. For instance, the Borel subsets of the real line form a countably generated
σ-algebra, since it is the smallest σ-algebra that contains all open intervals with
rational endpoints. In general, the Borel subsets of any separable metric space
form a countably generated σ-algebra.
Theorem 5 (Countably generated σ-algebras) Assume that L is a countably
generated σ-algebra. Then for any Arrovian rule that has an empty invisible
dictator there exists a nested collection of decisive coalitions that has an empty
intersection.
8I thank Luis ´ Ubeda for suggesting this argument.
16PROOF: Let S =(Sn)n∈N be a countable collection of sets such that L =σ(S).
Let D be the free ultraﬁlter of all decisive coalitions. We can assume without loss
of generality that, for all n, Sn ∈ D, because otherwise we replace that set by its
complement. Hence, assume from now on that S ⊂ D.
For each m∈N, let Tm =∩n≤mSn. Since D is closed under ﬁnite intersections,
we have that / 0 6= Tm ∈ D for all m. We also have by construction that m0 ≥ m ⇒
Tm0 ⊂ Tm, and
B :=
\
m∈N
Tm =
\
n∈N
Sn
If B = / 0 then we are done. Assume therefore that B 6= / 0.
Since L is a σ-algebra, B∈L. We claim that B is an atom of L. If this were
not true, then the σ-algebra L/∼B ∪{N, / 0} (see subsection 6.3 in the appendix,
and especially proposition 4) would be strictly smaller than L but would also
contain S, which contradicts the fact that L = σ(S).
Now, if the atom B were in D, this would contradict the fact that D is a free
ultraﬁlter. Therefore, N \B ∈ D, and hence for all m, Tm\B = Tm∩(N \B) ∈ D.
Thus, (Tm\B)m∈N is a nested collection of decisive coalitions that has an empty
intersection. 2
Twomeasurablespacesareisomorphicifthereisabijectionbetweenthemthat
is measurable, and whose inverse is also measurable. A Borel space is a measur-
able space which is isomorphic to a Borel subset of the real line with its induced
Borel σ-algebra. Since the σ-algebra in Borel spaces is countably generated, we
have the following corollary.
Corollary 5 (Borel spaces) Let (N,L) be any Borel space. Then for any Arro-
vian rule that has an empty invisible dictator there exists a nested collection of
decisive coalitions that has an empty intersection.
Actually, if one is willing to believe the Continuum Hypothesis (which is an
unproven conjecture), a much stronger result appears: if the agent space has the
cardinality of the continuum, and the admissible coalitions form a σ–algebra that
contains the singletons, then the selection problem always has a positive answer.
The details are in section 6.4 in the appendix.
We should ﬁnally point out that the failure of the selection problem to have
a positive answer is rather attributable to a lack of balance between the set of
admissible coalitions and the cardinality of the agent space. If the algebra or σ–
algebra of admissible coalitions is too narrow with respect to the cardinality of N,
then we may run into problems.
175 Conclusions
Since Fishburn [7] ﬁrst showed the possibility of the existence of non-dictatorial
Arrovian preference aggregation rules in societies with inﬁnitely many agents,
there has been an interest in precisely characterizing those rules and knowing in
what sense the passage to inﬁnity allows the transition from dictatorial to non-
dictatorial rules. One may wonder why economists (social scientists) should
worry about this fact. The answer is that, in general, inﬁnite societies are a mod-
eling device that is used to study the properties of large, but ﬁnite, societies, as is
exempliﬁed by the competitive paradigm. In this case, a desirable property of the
model is to have “continuity at inﬁnity,” that is, that the properties of the inﬁnite
society correspond to the limit of the corresponding properties of ﬁnite societies
when the number of individuals in them tends to inﬁnity. Fishburn’s paper shows
that, with regard to Arrow’s theorem, there is a discontinuity at inﬁnity: in any
ﬁnite society, an Arrovian rule gives rise to a dictator, while there are inﬁnite so-
cieties with no dictator associated to the corresponding limiting Arrovian rule. In
this paper, we have tried to show that one can deﬁne things in such a way that
there is no discontinuity: a dictator is a very small decisive coalition, so if one
looks at the right concept of smallness, we may still say that the limiting inﬁnite
society has arbitrarily small decisive coalitions.
The case which we have termed “Non–Measurable Invisible Dictators” is dif-
ferent. Here what happens is related to the interpretation of the restrictions one
imposes on the admissibility of coalitions. We may think of admissible coalitions
as those that can be “seen” by the individuals in our society. Consider now the
case in which the “Non–Measurable Invisible Dictator” is a single individual, as in
example 1 above. The Arrovian preference aggregation rule the society has, gives
all the power to this individual, that is, any coalition that has her as a member is
decisive, and any decisive coalition necessarily has her as a member. However, the
individual is not “visible” to society, because when seen as a one–member coali-
tion she is not admissible, so she is not publicly identiﬁable because she always
appears surrounded by other individuals. She truly is an “invisible dictator.” Of
course, in this case there is no question about her smallness: she is small, because
she is the smallest unit our algebra of coalitions allows.
An interesting line of work would be to explicitly model the process of coali-
tion formation, and see if the derived coalitional structure is such that the results
of this paper are applicable.
186 Appendix
6.1 Simple rules
Given a preference proﬁle ρ and a nonempty collection D ⊂ L, deﬁne a binary relation
P on X by xPy ⇔ ∃D ∈ D such that ∀i ∈ D, I[ρ(i)](x,y) = 1. Deﬁne also a binary relation
R in X by xRy ⇔ not yPx. The next lemma is basically the proof of part ii of theorem 1 in
Kirman and Sondermann [12], and proposition 3.1 in Armstrong [2].
Lemma 6 Let assumption (UD) hold. If D is an ultraﬁlter, then R is reﬂexive, transitive
and complete, and P is asymetric and negatively transitive. That is, R is a weak preference
relation and P the corresponding strict preference. The preference aggregation rule thus
deﬁned satisﬁes unanimity and (PI), and D coincides with the collection of its decisive
sets.
PROOF: We claim that xRy if, and only if, Rxy
. =

i∈N :I[ρ(i)](x,y)∈{0,1}
	
∈D. The
proof is immediate from the deﬁnitions and the fact that D is an ultraﬁlter.
Now the fact that R is reﬂexive follows from Rxx = N ∈ D. Transitivity follows be-
cause the fact that Rxy and Ryz are in D implies that so is Rxz ⊃ Rxy ∩Ryz ∈ D. Finally,
completeness follows because Rxy / ∈D implies N\Rxy =

i∈N :I[ρ(i)](x,y)=−1
	
∈D.
Since N ∈ D, the preference aggregation rule satisﬁes Unanimity. Pairwise Inde-
pendence is satisﬁed because the social preference between each pair of alternatives de-
pends only on the individual preferences between those alternatives. By construction,
each D ∈ D is decisive with respect to the new rule. Since the aggregation rule is Ar-
rovian, its collection of decisive sets is an ultraﬁlter. That is, the decisive sets form an
ultraﬁlter that contains the ultraﬁlter D: by maximality of ultraﬁlters, both must coincide.
2
If D is an ultraﬁlter, the (Arrovian) preference aggregation rule deﬁned above is called
the simple rule deﬁned by D. Note that, among all rules that have D as their decisive sets,
the simple rule is the one that gives rise to the smallest (as a subset of X ×X) strict social
preference.
6.2 Atoms of algebras
In section 4 we have deﬁned the equivalence relation ∼ that identiﬁes points that are not
separated by the algebra L. We have also deﬁned the concepts of atom of an algebra,
and of a fully atomic algebra, which we use in this section. We prove next a few auxiliary
results.
Lemma 7 If A is an atom of L, then A is an equivalence class of ∼.
19PROOF: Let A be an atom of L. Since A 6= / 0, there is i ∈ A. By deﬁnition of ∼, A must
contain the entire equivalence class of i. Suppose now there is j ∈ A such that j 6∼ i. By
deﬁnition of ∼, there is B ∈ L such that i ∈ B and j / ∈ B. But then j ∈ A\B and i / ∈ A\B,
which implies that A\B ⊂ A, A\B 6= A and A\B 6= / 0, a contradiction with the fact that A
is an atom. 2
Lemma 8 Let i ∈ N. If the equivalence class of i, a(i), belongs to L, then it is an atom.
PROOF: Suppose not. Then ∃B ∈ L, B ⊂ a(i), B 6= a(i) and B 6= / 0. If we let j ∈
a(i)\B and k ∈ B, then by assumption j ∼ k since both are in a(i), but k ∈ B and j / ∈ B, a
contradiction. 2
Corollary 6 The algebra L can be identiﬁed with an algebra on the quotient space N/∼.
This new algebra satisﬁes assumption (FC) if, and only if, L is fully atomic.
Proposition 3 Let D be an ultraﬁlter of sets of L, and let M = ∩{D : D ∈ D}. Assume
that M 6= / 0. Then M is an equivalence class of ∼.
PROOF: Let i ∈ M. It is clear that the equivalence class of i, a(i), must also be contained
in M, because D is a subset of L. Suppose now that M 3 j such that j 6∼ i. Then there is
B ∈ L such that i ∈ B and j ∈ Bc. Since D is an ultraﬁlter, either B or Bc must be in it. In
either case, this implies a contradiction (e.g., if B ∈ D, then j ∈ Bc implies j / ∈ M). 2
6.3 Reduction of algebras
Our next objective is to deﬁne, given a certain algebra L, a smaller algebra where all
subsets of a given set have been taken away. This is not a trivial exercise, since unions of
those subsets with other sets in the algebra have to be removed also. We perform the task
by resorting again to an equivalence relation.
Given B ⊂ N, deﬁne on L the binary relation A ∼B A0 if A M A0 ⊂ B. (Recall that
A M A0 = (A\A0)∪(A0\A).) Then we have:
Lemma 9 For any B ⊂ N, the relation ∼B is an equivalence relation.
PROOF: Reﬂexivity and symmetry of ∼B are immediate from its deﬁnition. Transitivity
follows from:
(A M A00) ⊂ (A M A0)∪(A0 M A00)
20Which in turn follows from:
A\A00 ⊂ (A\A0)∪(A0\A00)
A00\A ⊂ (A00\A0)∪(A0\A)
2
Proposition 4 Given any B ∈ L, the quotient space L/∼B ∪{N, / 0} can be identiﬁed
with an algebra of subsets of N. Furthermore, if L is a σ-algebra, the quotient space
can be identiﬁed with a σ-algebra. The new (σ-)algebra is strictly contained in L if, and
only if, B is not an atom of L.
PROOF: Let us assume L is a σ-algebra (if it is only an algebra, replace countable
unions with ﬁnite ones in the proof).
The general idea of the proof is to take as representative of any equivalence class its
smallest set. We have that A0 ∼B A implies that A0 ∼B (A\B), because A0 \(A\B) ⊂
(A0\A)∪B, and (A\B)\A0 ⊂ (A\A0). Next, note that, in this case, we have (A\B) ⊂ A0,
because if this were not true there would exist i such that i ∈ A, i / ∈ A0, and i / ∈ B, which
would contradict the fact that A M A0 ⊂ B. Therefore, we can unambiguously take as
representative of the equivalence class of any A 6= B the set A\B. We take B as the
representative of its equivalence class.
Next, note that
A M A0 = Ac M (A0)c
impliesthatA∼B A0 if, andonlyif, Ac ∼B (A0)c. Takingintoaccounttheidentity(A\B)c =
(Ac\B)∪B, we can see that L/∼B ∪{N, / 0} is closed under complementation.
Finally, if (An)n∈N and (A0
n)n∈N are sequences contained in the σ-algebra L, we have:
(∪nAn) M
 
∪nA0
n

⊂
[
n
 
An\A0
n

∪
 
A0
n\An

=
[
n
 
An M A0
n

Therefore, if for all n we have An ∼B A0
n, this implies that ∪nAn ∼B ∪nA0
n. So closedness
of L/∼B ∪{N, / 0} under countable unions follows because
∪n(An\B) = (∪nAn)\B
By construction, the new σ-algebra is a subset of L. If B is an atom of L, it is easy
to see that L/∼B ∪{N, / 0} coincides with L. Otherwise, there is a set B0 ⊂ B, B0 6= / 0, and
B0 6= B, that is in L but not in L/∼B ∪{N, / 0}. 2
216.4 In the realm of conjecture
Mathematicians have not been able to prove or disprove the following conjecture, called
theContinuumHypothesis: “thereisnosetwithacardinalitystrictlylargerthanthatofthe
natural numbers and strictly smaller than that of the real numbers.” It has, nevertheless,
been shown that the stronger Generalized Continuum Hypothesis (“there is no set with a
cardinality strictly larger than that of a given inﬁnite set and strictly smaller than that of its
power set”) is independent of the Zermello–Fraenkel set theory plus the axiom of choice
(which, by the way, we use freely in this paper).
If one accepts the Continuum Hypothesis as valid, then our selection problem has a
positive answer for a wide class of situations in which the agent set has the cardinality of
the continuum. The results we present next should be taken with caution, given that they
rely on an unproven conjecture.
Lemma 10 Assume the Continuum Hypothesis is valid. Then there exists an increasing
collection of countable subsets of [0,1] whose union is [0,1].
PROOF: The ﬁrst part of the proof follows closely the proof of theorem 1.11 of Aliprantis
and Border [1]. Start with [0,1] and well-order it. Without danger of confusion, denote
by ≤ the order. For any α, let I(α) = {α0 ∈ [0,1] : α0 ≤ α} be the initial segment
corresponding to α. Following the steps (and the notation) of the proof of the above
mentioned theorem, we end up with an uncountable set W, well-ordered by ≤, that has
a greatest element ω1 (the ﬁrst uncountable ordinal), and such that the initial segment of
any α 6= ω1 is countable. Let W0 = W\{ω1}. By the Continuum Hypothesis, since W0 is
uncountable it has the cardinality of [0,1], so there exists a bijection φ between the two
sets. For any α ∈ W0, letCα ⊂ [0,1] be deﬁned by
Cα = φ[I(α)] =

φ(α0) : α0 ≤ α
	
By construction, for any α the set Cα is countable. Also, since W0 is linearly ordered by
≤, given any two distinct α and α0, either α ≤ α0 or α0 ≤ α, which implies that either
Cα ⊂Cα0 orCα0 ⊂Cα. In other words, the collection (Cα)α∈W0 is an increasing collection
of countable sets. Since φ is a bijection between W0 and [0,1], it follows that the union of
this collection is [0,1].9 2
Proposition 5 Assume the validity of the Continuum Hypothesis. Let N =[0,1] and let L
be a σ-algebra of its subsets. Suppose that assumption (FC) is satisﬁed, i.e. all singletons
are admissible coalitions. Then for any Arrovian rule that has an empty invisible dictator
there exists a nested collection of decisive coalitions that has an empty intersection.
9I thank Herv´ e Moulin for suggesting the line of proof used here.
22PROOF: If the ultraﬁlter of decisive coalitions contains a countable set, then we can apply
corollary 4.
Otherwise, the fact that L is a σ-algebra and contains all singletons implies that
it contains all ﬁnite, countable, coﬁnite, and cocountable (complements of countable)
sets. Since we assume that no countable set is decisive, we have that all cocountable sets
are decisive. To obtain a decreasing collection of cocountable sets whose intersection is
empty, apply lemma 10 and take complements. 2
Corollary 7 Assume the validity of the Continuum Hypothesis. Let N = [0,1], and let
L be a σ-algebra of its subsets. Assume that the algebra L is fully atomic. Then for
any Arrovian rule that has an empty invisible dictator there exists a nested collection of
decisive coalitions that has an empty intersection.
PROOF: By corollary 6 in the appendix, L can be identiﬁed with an algebra on the quo-
tient space, in which all singletons are measurable. If the quotient space is countable, we
apply theorem 4, otherwise by the continuum hypothesis its cardinality is that of [0,1], so
there is a bijection between both sets. This bijection induces a measurable isomorphism,
so we can then apply proposition 5. 2
Corollary 8 Assume the validity of the Continuum Hypothesis. Let (N,L) be such that
the agent space N has the cardinality of the continuum, and L is a σ-algebra. Then for
any Arrovian rule that has an empty invisible dictator there exists a nested collection of
decisive coalitions that has an empty intersection, provided L is fully atomic.
PROOF: There is a bijection between N and [0,1]. The image of L under this bijection
is a σ-algebra on [0,1], so we apply corollary 7. 2
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